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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 22/01/2004 Accident number: 27 
Accident time: 10:30 Accident Date: 23/05/1997 




Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Other Date of main report: 30/06/1997 
ID original source: ADP-8/DG Name of source: ADP/CND/IND 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: route (dirt) 
Date record created: 22/01/2004 Date  last modified: 22/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude: 32° 39' 49" E Latitude: 25° 30' 06" S 
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
victim ill (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
 
Accident report 
A copy of an internal accident report and a report made by the National demining authority 
were made available in November 2000. The following summarises their content (edited for 
anonymity).  
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The mined area was approximately 10 metres wide and circled Maluana defensively. The 
ground was loose and sandy with a covering of "close brush up to 1.8 metres high" and a few 
trees of "moderate height". The mines were not laid in a recognisable pattern. The area had 
been fenced and strands of barbed wire remained marking the edges of the mined area. The 
area to the North of the minefield had not been used by the locals as a source of firewood, 
although they could not say why they did not go there. On inspection following the accident an 
old military boot with blast damage was found there, adding further evidence that the 
minefield had been extended in that area. 
An investigation was made by the Deputy Director of the National MA authority and a UN QA 
officer. They found that the victim had stepped on a PMN on a disused track and suffered 
traumatic amputation to his left leg below the knee, injuries to his eyes and "small wounds" on 
his right leg.  
He received first aid within 4 minutes and was evacuated by "road platoon vehicle and 
ambulance" arriving within "1.5min" [presumably 1.5 hrs].  
A Technical advisor's report noted that conflicts in the reports made it uncertain at what time 
the accident had occurred, but that it was first reported by radio at 10:30 when a CASEVAC 
was requested. 
The victim had just finished one lane and moved his tools to the start of a new lane when he 
checked the time and realised he had two minutes before there was a shift change so he 
decided to go to the toilet. He told a deminer in a lane 30 metres away that he was feeling 
unwell and was going to ask the section Commander to be "stood down" as soon as he had 
been to the toilet.  
The victim went down the cleared lane and stepped into a "supposedly clear area". He moved 
into the centre of a clump of bushes to find a place to defecate, then stepped on a PMN. He 
suffered a "traumatic amputation of his left leg at the knee", small wounds on his right leg and 
"possibly impaired sight" in both eyes. 
First aid was applied at the site and the victim stabilised [deminers "extracted" the victim a 
distance of three metres into his finished clearance lane first] then the victim was stretchered 
to the safety vehicle and started the journey to Maputo. It was met by the demining group's 
ambulance en route to Maputo and the victim transferred (the ambulance left Maputo when 
the call for MEDEVAC was received).  
The victim arrived at hospital "approximately 65 minutes" after the accident [conflict in 
reports]. 
The demining group's SOPs required that they start two metres from the inside of a defensive 
minefield and stop five metres outside the outer edge. This was being done. The survey 
technique involved driving survey lanes through the mined area at 50 metre intervals and this 
would not have guaranteed that the extension to the fenced area was found. The survey of 
the minefield had not mentioned minefield depth or the remains of fences (some parts of 
fence were missing). When the tactical value of the land was considered, the investigator 
believed that he could see that it overlooked the main road North, was two kilometres from a 
military camp and so was considered potentially tactically "vital". He thought it probable that 
RENAMO had launched probes into the area and that the minefield had been reinforced to 
cover an attempted breach. The investigator suggested that tactical appreciation be added to 
future surveys. 
The demining SOPs required deminers to use a toilet area, but at the time the area was 
simply anywhere convenient outside the mined area. The survey had failed to locate a third 
fence. "..the actions of an individual were to blame, not procedures or equipment".  
The investigator continued "The deeper issue of tactical appreciation may be beyond the 
Survey Sections and some Operations Field Supervisory Staff…" Surveyors should strive for 
accuracy. 
The deminer in the adjacent lane confirmed that the victim has said he was going to ask for 
sick leave. 
The paramedic said that the accident occurred at 10:25. 
2 
The victim stated that his accident occurred at 11:30 when he had taken three steps forward 
of the end of his lane into the clear area and on the fourth step activated the mine. 
 
Conclusions 
The investigator determined that the accident occurred because "the realisation that mines 
could exist on the enemy side of the minefield was either ignored or forgotten....the actions of 
an individual were to blame, not procedures or equipment".  
The demining SOPs required deminers to use a toilet area, but at the time the area was 
simply anywhere convenient outside the mined area. The survey had failed to locate a third 
fence. The investigator went on "The deeper issue of tactical appreciation may be beyond the 




The investigator recommended that: 
• Deminers be discouraged from using toilets on the "enemy side" of a minefield 
• Changes to survey practice be made to "chase" discovered wires. 
• All sites should have a latrine and SOPs amended to reflect this.  
• Deminers should be warned of the "dangers of moving outside the surveyed 
minefield".  
• The North of the minefield should be surveyed immediately.  
• Survey procedures should be "examined".  
• Survey mapping procedures should be revised to identify area of perimeter fencing, 
and tactical appreciation be considered for inclusion in "the Survey function". 
 
The Chief UN Technical Advisor to the demining group concluded that the deminer was 
feeling unwell and stepped into an unknown area to "relieve himself". The victim believed he 
was acting properly. Areas of ambiguity in the SOPs "reinforces our actions to re-write and re-
issue them" . 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 41 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 33 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: US$3,360 Time to hospital: 1 hour 30 minutes 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: none 
 








Leg Through knee 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The paramedic reported that he gave the victim "75ml of pethidine IM and 1000ml of 
Hamaccel IV" at the site and he was evacuated immediately. 
A brief medical report from the demining group's staff doctor made on the 27th May 1997 
stated that the victim "suffered the following injuries: 
Amputation and complete destruction of the left foot and lower [unintelligible]  third of the 
lower leg. 
Injuries of the eyes; 
Left eye: Complete [unintelligible], foreign bodies in the Cornea, traumatic cataract. 
Right eye: Foreign bodies in the cornea. 
Four smaller wounds around the eyes containing foreign bodies. 
Several small wounds, particularly on the right leg, caused by small fragments. 
At arrival to hospital his general condition was good. Around one hour after arrival he was 
subjected to a though-the-knee amputation of the left leg, [unintelligible] debridements and 
suture of his [unintelligible] wound and cleaning of his eyes. His general condition is 
satisfactory. His wound after the amputation is clean and can probably be closed in a few 
days to one week. His eyes are recovering. He can see reasonably with his right eye but the 
left eye still is not much better." 
A further medical report my same doctor on the 10th of June 1997 stated that: 
"His wound on the stump of the left leg was closed by a secondary suture on 6th June 1997. 
At inspection the wound looks clean and probably will heal under the next few weeks. 
An operation of his left eye is scheduled for 12th June 1997. It is planned to remove the 
traumatic cataract and an implantation of an artificial lens. 
After having complained about problems with his ears, he was examined on 6th June 1997 by 
a specialist with an ear microscope. His ears were cleaned and his condition improved. 
Audiometry is still to be done this week." 
The victim’s DOB was given as 25/04/64. 
 
Analysis 
This accident is classed as “Other” and the Primary cause “Inadequate survey” because the 
method of survey allowed a mined area to be missed. The victim followed normal practise and 
accepted the quality of the survey, so (despite the investigator's opinion) no blame can 
reasonably be attributed to him.  
The secondary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" 
because the approved method of survey allowed a mined area adjacent to the minefield to be 
believed clear. The survey method was inadequate and this failing was (in part) recognised by 
the group's own investigation when the Chief UN Technical Advisor to the demining group 
concluded that areas of ambiguity in the SOPs "reinforces our actions to re-write and re-issue 
them". The methods of survey, recording and survey training have been subsequently 
extensively revised, so confirming that the methods in place at the time of this accident were 
inadequate.  
4 
Despite this, the accident investigator held the victim responsible for moving into an area 
outside the minefield and outside the area scheduled to be cleared. Rather obviously, if the 
minefield is declared clear but mines adjacent to it are left, civilians with confidence in the 
clearance will risk being injured. This raises the obvious question, is it better for a deminer to 
"find" a missed mine or the general public?" 
The demining group’s failure to have an ambulance at the site was an example of an 
inadequate medical provision. 




The victim's employment contract was on file, showing that he was born on 25/04/64. 
 An out-of-scale computer generated sketch map of the area showed a third fence added - 
bulging outward - outside the perimeter of the double fenced minefield. 
A hand drawn sketch map of the entire minefield was on file. The "waypoint log" of the area 
cleared was on file. An EOD team task completion record (demolition of 4 POMZ-2M and 5 
grenades) was on file.  
The victim was a member of a platoon operating since 23rd May 1997 – that had cleared 
115,741m2, 215 AP mines, 1 AG mine and 42 UXOs.  Since starting work at the site they had 
cleared “45 mines of Soviet origin and found no booby traps or devices to hinder search. 
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